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ABSTRACT 
In major cities around the world, the appetite for better mass transit systems is strong – with 
many locations needing to enhance both capacity and coverage to address population 
growth and increased transport movement. Available resources from traditional government 
sources are limited, however. In this paper, several potential ‘alternative’ project financing 
structures will be reviewed – mainly focusing on PPPs – but also briefly taking-in ‘Joint 
Powers’ and other  arrangements operating under a ‘blended’ financing model.  
 
The paper seeks to analyse and clarify the attributes, pitfalls, and potential benefits of these 
different arrangements, drawing on the documentation and stated aims of several recent and 
current worldwide exemplars. A literature review and summary case study approach is 
adopted - with reference to mainstream sources on mass transit capital financing and 
planning. Cross-comparison of the different approaches adopted in various exemplars is 
engaged.  
 
The paper then draws interpretation of the wider applicability of these project options for 
future mass transit delivery efforts – and touches on the conditions, criteria, and policy 
settings under which they might be positioned to deliver effectively.  
 
The paper addresses substantive, current and emerging issues around the ability of transit 
stakeholders in growing cities to surpass the limitations of prevailing project financing 
cultures and constraints. 
 
 
Keywords: public transport finance, mass transit project, PPPs, joint powers 
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1. INTRODUCTION – END OF THE LINE FOR BUSINESS AS 
USUAL 
 
Transport planning and transport infrastructure decisions are proverbially political in nature. 
But a different discussion opens-up when researchers step back from the parochial debate 
about which projects receive funding in which locations and when. The time may have come 
for a more nuanced discussion regarding the options available to accelerate the roll-out of 
needed public transport infrastructure.  
 
Certain jurisdictions such as Los Angeles, under their “30-10” rubric  seem on the face of it to 
have found a solution in which a suite of transport projects is accelerated into delivery (LA 
MCTA 2010a; 2010b). It is difficult to identify any negatives around the 30-10 concept. If 
anything, one wonders why such approaches are not more widely adopted (politics aside). 
Equally we could look at the high-intensity transit environments of East Asia and identify a 
commercially-oriented approach that seems to have been remarkably successful in 
supporting mass transit infrastructure delivery over an extended period (Cervero & Murakami 
2009; Miller & Hale 2011). Again, one may wonder what the drawbacks of these approaches 
could possibly be... 
 
In Australia and the UK, however, and to some degree in the United States, any discussion 
around project financing innovation for public transport seems to leap immediately and 
heroically into an assumption that public private partnerships (PPPs) are the only option 
worth considering (see RTD 2007; IPA 2012). Indeed, project documentation from the Gold 
Coast Rapid Transit project recently suggested, tautologically, that the PPP methodology 
was chosen because;  
 
“...all three levels of government felt a strong obligation to develop a delivery method which 
would meet the desires of the market for a large Public Private Partership (PPP).”  
(GCRT 2011, p28)  
 
PPPs seem to work to a degree in fields such as water and energy supply, or in toll road 
projects, although outcomes are mixed there at best for investors. But the track record in 
public transport is thin. Review of recent literature (admittedly primarily industry-written, 
rather than academic) would even suggest a certain level of crudeness in the PPP 
intellectual space – in which the concepts of “transport projects” and/or “road projects” are 
confused (see IPA 2012, p13; PWC 2011). The transport-related capital investment PPPs 
delivered so-far (in Australia at least) are overwhelmingly road projects. Hence it may be time 
for PPP scholars and participants to use more specific and nuanced language – and talk 
about “road PPPs” when that is what they mean, rather than “transport infrastructure PPPs” – 
which tends to imply a degree of inter-changeability that is not reflected in the mix of actual 
delivered projects, nor in the specific skills needed in different types of transport project.  
 
In that sense, this paper offers opportunity for critical review of the role that PPPs are playing 
very specifically in public transport infrastructure delivery – and this is done primarily through 
appraisal of recent literature, and through a consolidated listing of recognised public 
transport PPPs. For despite the meagre representation of mass transit in the overall set of 
transport-related private finance projects, recent years do seem to have seen a certain 
threshold crossed – and a small but possibly critical mass of public transport PPPs have 
been transacted, implemented, or put out to tender (at the time of writing).  
 
In short - public transport researchers can no longer ignore the idea of transit PPPs – and 
their future is something of an open book.  
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Table 1. Selected Contemporary Transit PPPs & Innovative Projects: 
Asia-Pacific & North America 
Project Location Reported 
Value  
($US at 2012) 
Major 
Private 
Investor 
% private 
capital 
Project type & 
commentary 
Timing 
KL Central 
Stationi 
Kuala 
Lumpur, 
Malaysia 
$184m Malaysian 
Resources 
Corp. 
64% Major station 
facilities & TOD 
project. Build, 
operate, transfer 
Transaction 
2000. Opened 
2001 
Southern 
Cross 
Stationii 
Melbourne, 
VIC 
$309m 
(NPV)* 
Civic Nexus 100% Iconic urban 
station 
interchange.  
Design-B-O-T 
Contract 2002, 
completed 
2006. 30 year 
mgt term. 
Shenzhen 
Subway 
Line 4iii 
Guangdong 
Province 
(Southern 
China) 
$733m HK MTR Corp. 100% B-O-T. 15 
stations. “Classic 
east-Asian metro 
rail” configuration. 
Direct negotiation 
process. 
Transaction 
2005, 
Opened 2011, 
transfer 2035 
Beijing 
Subway 
Line 4iv 
Beijing City $577m HK MTR Corp. 49% B-O-T. 24 
stations. “Classic 
east-Asian metro 
rail” configuration. 
Competitive 
tender. 
Transaction 
2006, 
Opened 2009, 
transfer 2036 
Transbay 
Terminalv 
San 
Francisco, CA 
$4.2b Private N/A. 
Transbay Joint 
Powers 
Authority 
nil Major station 
facilities & TOD 
project. Joint 
Powers Authority 
Transaction 
2003. Expected 
full completion 
2017 
Eagle P3 
Projectvi 
Denver, CO $2.185b Denver Transit 
Partners 
(consortium) 
Around 50%  Light & heavy rail 
expansion PPP. 
Incl. design, build, 
infrastructure & 
rolling stock. 
Operate on 
availability basis 
RFQ 2008, 
transaction 
2010, 50 year 
build/operate 
period (?)** 
Waratah Sydney, NSW $3.6b 
(AUD)
vii 
Reliance Rail 
(consortium) 
~ 100% Heavy rail rolling 
stock – design, 
build, maintain 78 
trains (& 
maintenance 
facility) 
Contract date 
2006. Specify 
operate 2013 – 
2043
viii
 
Program 
slippage has 
occurred. 
Gold Coast 
Light Rail – 
phase 1  
Gold Coast, 
QLD 
$949m 
(AUD)
ix
 
GoldLinq 
(consortium) 
100%.  
Construct & 
avail. 
payments 
from local, 
state & 
national govt 
Light rail – design, 
build, operate. 
Availability 
payments. 
Franchisee 
appointed  May 
2011. 
Operation 
commence due 
2014, till 2029
x
 
Manila LRT 
Line 1xi 
Manila $1.25b TBA 50% Light rail 
extension – build, 
operate, maintain 
Tender late 
2012 
Northwest 
Rail Linkxii 
Sydney 
metropolitan 
region, NSW 
TBA 
TBA  “optimal 
combination” 
sought. Avail. 
payments 
from State 
govt 
Heavy rail –
operations, 
maintenance & 
rolling stock. 
Competitive 
tender 
Tender early 
2013. 
 
10-15 year 
contract likely 
notes: *total amount debated; ** agreement term is poorly documented 
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First steps into greater engagement with the potential of public transport PPPs are taken in 
Table 1 – which summarises a selection of mainstream contemporary projects, alongside a 
San Francisco project also considered “innovative” (but not a PPP, as such). A researcher 
interested in public transport projects is perhaps compelled by this listing of exemplars to 
countenance and engage with the idea of PPPs emerging as a mainstream transit 
infrastructure delivery model. An imperative arises to grapple in earnest with transit PPPs, to 
understand their strengths, weaknesses and nuances, and to engage in constructive 
communication, dialogue and analysis with the aim of improving practice and understanding 
(suggested also in Shaoul et al 2012).  
 
From this listing of recent projects (in Table 1.), one set of issues and challenges appears to 
revolve around engineering design and transit system performance focus (or project 
scope). Another set of imperatives seems to arise from the once-off transaction or up-front 
contract arrangement (and the manner in which that agreement is then monitored and 
repositioned over the longer-run). This is related to another set of needs and demands 
around the medium and longer-term operations and business goals of the transit project 
or partnership (as distinct from the purely contractual treatment of such). 
 
Stepping back, one dares to suggest that a water or energy supply PPP might be more easily 
defined... or possibly has fewer ‘parameters’. They assume perhaps a certain quantum of 
energy or water supply, at a certain quality or specification, delivered to certain locations over 
an agreed time horizon, in return for certain payments. When we come to public transport 
movements, however, the changing and inherently variable demands of passengers and 
local residents seems to add an entire additional layer of complexity and “noisiness” in 
operational and contract terms (see ‘traditional’ transit infrastructure sources such as Vuchic 
2005; 2007; Mees 2010; DfT 2011; Hale 2011a). Some PPP experts may be willing to argue 
that energy, water and/or roads are equally “people-defined”, but at this stage of the paper it 
seems worth raising the possibility that a public transport PPP is another type of PPP entirely 
– and quite possibly a more difficult and challenging variant. This seems to connect again 
with the curious industry-readiness to engage in discussion of “transport PPPs” (see IPA 
2012; PWC 2011) while studiously skirting the more specific topic of public transport PPPs.  
 
In this paper (via table 1 as a starting point, and then in Part 4) we also bring in an emergent 
analysis of project arrangements one step beyond the narrow industry-accepted definition of 
“a PPP”. All kinds of projects invariably involve partnerships, and invariably they involve a 
cast of public and private entities. But the emphasis in certain other emerging models (joint 
powers arrangements, for example) may well extend relatively effortlessly beyond the 
transactional, and connect with medium and longer-term city building and public transport 
ridership objectives (see Miller & Hale 2011 for contextual discussion). We also briefly (in 
Part 2.) refer back to the pros-and-cons of ‘traditional procurement’ approaches for the 
delivery of transit infrastructure enhancement. Undoubtedly these will continue to be utilised 
– and any shift toward PPPs needs to demonstrate an addressing of the pros involved in 
traditional methods, and some bettering of the cons. Part 3 offers the primary engagement 
with mainstream options for public transport PPP. 
 
From review of these options and arrangements one thing seems to be emerging clearly 
even at this early stage... The immediate and longer-term future of mass transit projects and 
financing in the USA or Australia (in particular) is unlikely to be the same as the previous 20 
years. The paper discusses a list of ‘reasons’ and strategic realities that clarify this new 
juncture in transit project approaches.  
 
In project financing for mass transit, we seem to have reached the end of the line for 
business as usual.  
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2. REFLECTIONS ON TRADITIONAL TRANSIT 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROCUREMENT 
 
Depending on our assessment criteria, ‘traditional procurement’ could either be seen as the 
method most oriented to the public interest, or the method that is least likely to deliver 
substantial quanta of new infrastructure in a given city over a given period. Hodge & Duffield 
(2010, ch17) paint a picture of the long-term industry circumstances that contextualised ever-
greater movement away from ‘traditional’ procurement, into PPP/PFI and related forms.  
 
The pros of traditional approaches revolve around the ability of government agencies to plan 
and procure infrastructure that is entirely fit-for-purpose, and scoped to address the needs of 
future users. Mainstream ideas of the ‘proper method for planning rail transport projects’ tend 
to describe the same process that occurs under traditional procurement and agency-side 
project management (see Profillidis 2006, p112) - rather than the course of pre-construction 
events that is described in PPP literature or practice. The focus in this approach would 
appear to be more firmly oriented on the operation of the infrastructure once-complete. A 
‘traditional’ procurement of some section of mass transit infrastructure is a sub-set of the 
operationally-focussed activities of a transit agency or government transport stakeholder. 
The question of contracts and transactions is not merely lesser-order, under this traditional 
thinking - they become almost invisible as issues. The procuring stakeholder is seen as 
managing and operating mass transit day-to-day, and then occasionally it steps outside of 
that immediate-term focus to design and deliver something that presumably meets a 
recognised (and/or estimated) need into the future.  
 
The cons of this mode of endeavour, however, are also clearly evident - and a range of 
stakeholders and commentators remind us of these regularly. Cost over-runs have been 
nominated as public enemy number one in mass transit (Flyvbjerg et al 2004; Raisbeck et al 
2010). Analyses of this issue have not always clarified the difference between variation from 
early-stage cost-estimates, on the one hand – as opposed to any variation between contract 
cost and end cost. The latter form of variance is based on clearer scope, and tends to be 
subject to much smaller, if still notable, cost over-runs. 
 
Disconnect between the focus of design-construct actors and end-operators has also been 
raised as an issue with traditional transit infrastructure procurement (Duffield 2010, p194). 
And in a sense, PPPs and related policy directions are of themselves something of a critique 
of traditional methods. Acceptance of this critique seems to revolve very much around 
acceptance of the proposition that government or public sector actors are inefficient, and that 
private sector actors are inherently more efficient and creative (see Shaoul et al 2012 for 
nuanced discussion). This theme recurs in almost any project or policy-level discourse 
around the move toward PPPs in the Anglo world and beyond (summarised in Hodge & 
Duffield 2010, p400-401; RTD 2007). Indeed, it would be a brave or foolhardy commentator 
who stood on a soapbox to argue in favour of the productivity, efficiency, creativity or 
flexibility of public sector actors or Anglosphere transit agencies. On the other hand, the 
availability of clear benchmarking of relative private vs public sector labour or project 
efficiency is certainly nowhere near the level of the rhetorical or assertive emphasis that this 
topic receives (as per IPA 2012). At an anecdotal level, this particular researcher – who has 
worked alongside actors from both sectors – is not clear that employees of large private 
sector organisations such as consultancies are inherently “better” or “more productive” than 
their equivalents in slightly larger public sector organisations. Department for Transport, UK 
(2011) presents confounding evidence on this very topic, with the privatised, consultant-
dependent UK rail sector benchmarked as clearly less efficient than the more ‘public’, less 
consultant-reliant continental equivalent: 
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“The industry also has weaknesses in ...management which have allowed excessive wage 
drift, at all levels, and the continuation of inefficient work practices.” (DfT 2011, p10) 
 
A recent contribution from Shaoul et al (2012) seems to crystallise this problem of an 
assumption toward comparative private-sector efficiency that is not based on clear 
supporting evidence – at least in the UK transport context. 
 
The crux – not enough public transport infrastructure delivery... 
The one issue or critique around ‘traditional’ public sector transit infrastructure procurement 
in the Anglosphere (Australia, USA, UK perhaps) that this researcher is certain of surrounds 
the weak track record of system build-out over the past generation, relative to the equivalent 
level of investment and network expansion that has occurred in European or East Asian 
jurisdictions. Although, at the same time, it needs to be recognised that the European and 
Asian transit infrastructure build-out has not necessarily been a resounding demonstration of 
the absolute necessity of strict PPP-style approaches, per se (see Cervero & Murakami; 
Bratzel 1999; Peters 2010; Tang & Lo 2010). 
 
In these contexts, a clamour has arisen for new methods and options beyond ‘traditional’ 
procurement (Miller & Hale 2011; Hale 2011a; DfT 2012; Brookings Institution & 
Reconnecting America 2009; US GAO 2010). A number of the alternative options addressed 
in these sources are not PPPs. And this nascent enquiry into new, innovative and alternative 
project financing and implementation options appears to be a somewhat different line of 
enquiry to the leap-of-faith sometimes displayed in connecting lack of projects with PPPs as 
the only option worth considering (see Shaoul et al 2012). As an example of the more rigidly 
PPP-focused thinking, Infrastructure Partnerships Australia (2012) recently spoke in one 
paragraph of needing to adopt an ‘agnostic’ approach to the selection of delivery methods on 
a project-by-project basis, before daringly suggesting that PPPs would be the most likely 
approach (under this ‘agnostic’ selection of options):  
 
“The private sector already plays an important role in the delivery of publicly funded transport 
projects. However given the existing funding constraints and the inherent value of private 
sector risk transfer and innovation, it is sensible that the Government consider a greater role 
for the private sector in delivering and maintaining new transport infrastructure through Public 
Private Partnerships.” (IPA 2012, p18) 
 
IPA did not, at that point, nor elsewhere in their document, comprehensively or clearly 
document or benchmark any evidence of actual and/or observable “...inherent value of 
private sector risk transfer or innovation...”  
 
The literature, the observable reality, and the IPA document for that matter, all generally 
affirm that time has come for a new look at a range of options outside of traditional 
procurement for mass transit. PPPs could well be one of these methods, but we would 
invariably want to cast the net reasonably wide to countenance a full range of possibilities. If 
PPPs do indeed emerge as the logical solution to public transport under-investment, then 
few would argue with that outcome. But equally, it could be that revitalisation of traditional 
procurement strategies is part of the solution (and a certain amount of research and policy 
literature does indeed venture in this direction). Stakeholders are also increasingly interested 
to learn about any other options (outside of PPPs or traditional procurement) that hold 
promise for greater levels of transit project delivery (see Transport for NSW 2012, ch10).  
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3. TWO SORTS OF TRANSIT PPP 
 
In this section, two core public transport PPP options or types are reviewed. These are 
consolidated from the salient attributes of the exemplar projects detailed in Table 1. and 
themed into “availability-based” and “revenue-oriented” transit PPPs. 
 
Availability-based PPPs 
In an availability-based PPP for public transport, the transaction (presumably) does not 
reference ridership or farebox revenue realities to any significant degree. It may be 
suggested from the outset that this arrangement is probably the most “certain” from the 
private provider’s point of view and involves a greater level of risk-adoption from the public or 
government side to the transaction. The four exemplars listed in table 1. (Eagle P3, GCLR 
phase one, NWRL, and Waratah) offer interesting interpretive opportunities.  
 
Denver’s Eagle 
Eagle P3 appears to be based on the design and construction or upgrade (among other 
activities) of light and heavy rail corridors, and the running of vehicles up-and-down the 
corridor by some formula or agreed arrangement (RTD 2011; RTD & Denver Transit Partners 
2010; RTD 2008). An obvious counter-point to the procuring agency’s enthusiasm for this 
arrangement is that it seemingly renders the operator oblivious to the ridership and 
passenger-growth opportunities associated with rail service. Undoubtedly, this Denver 
corridor is presumed in the documentation to be a loss-making, heavily subsidised operation. 
But one would need to question the degree to which the transaction arrangement and the 
discussion in the documentation either presumes or perhaps reinforces that outcome... This 
researcher’s appraisal would also suggest that the ridership-oblivious nature of Eagle P3 has 
become apparent in its actual design and engineering. The project designs and fly-throughs 
seem to suggest light and heavy rail corridors that are:  
 
a) Lacking in connectedness and reference to any substantial set of obvious local-scale 
activity generators or ridership catchments 
b) Lacking integration to surrounding street networks. There appears to be no “structure 
plan” for the station areas as understood in the contemporary urban design literature 
or discussion (refer GCCC 2011 for contrast) 
c) Not embracing of contemporary notions around station-area TOD 
d) Predicated almost entirely on park-and-ride as the only access mechanism or 
infrastructure. Access by pedestrians, cyclists or bus feeder does not appear to be 
countenanced to any great degree – despite the important role these modal options 
play in most successful international rail-based transit offerings (see Hale 2011b) 
 
While not wishing to be overly negative about the Eagle P3 project or its proponents – this 
project exemplar could serve to alert other public transport financing stakeholders further 
abroad to the sorts of engineering and design outcomes that may well be a logical result of a 
PPP that does not reference ridership or ticket revenue-related goals. Eagle’s documentation 
also seems to express a transaction focus throughout, and this seems to be problematic for 
any longer-term strategic outcome (see RTD 2011, esp parts 1-2). 
 
Gold Coast Light Rail – Phase one (GCLR) 
The Gold Coast project, which involves construction and operations on an availability basis, 
(similar, in passing, to Eagle) seemingly differs from the Denver project substantially via its 
greater resourcing and development of an initial reference case design, prior to the 
solicitation of bids (see GCRT 2011; GCCC 2011). This renders the winning bidder 
responsible for detailed engineering design and then construction and delivery within more 
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clearly-developed and articulated corridor and performance parameters. These parameters 
have included emphasis on interacting with and enhancing the urban corridor through “city 
building” philosophies. In practicality, the scope of actual transit-supportive urban design 
infrastructure intervention via the GCLR project itself is relatively limited – but at the very 
least these outcomes are not precluded by the chosen design (GCRT 2011; GCCC 2011). 
 
The GCLR approach seems useful, in offering the idea that state and local government 
agencies would work together for a city-responsive, land-use responsive rail project 
outcome, with private sector innovation narrowed-down into still-challenging aspects such as 
rolling stock delivery, detailed engineering, and operational efficiency. Eagle’s procurers, by 
contrast, have placed great store in the “flexibility” and opportunities for “creativity” that a less 
proscriptive design approach implies. They nominate a project saving of some $300m as 
evidence of this value – although have not clearly demonstrated to the reader of their 
“lessons learned” document (RTD 2011) that this is an efficiency rather than a de-scoping 
outcome. Any confusion between productivity, innovation and efficiency on the one hand, 
and de-scoping (which is quite a different thing) on the other should be assiduously avoided 
in project contexts. 
 
“It is recommended that future projects similarly invest significant resources upfront into the 
development of the reference design.” (GCLR 2011, p35) 
 
On the other hand, GCLR seems to share Eagle’s lack of connectedness to any sense of a 
clear ridership growth or revenue incentive package – and this could be viewed as a problem 
in itself. 
 
North West Rail Link (NWRL) - Sydney 
The NWRL exemplar is interesting because it steps back completely from the idea 
(expressed via Eagle and GCLR) of fully-integrating infrastructure design, delivery, 
construction, and passenger operations (see Transport for NSW 2012a). NWRL’s main PPP 
play is “rolling stock supply and rail operations”. And there has been some advancement of 
the idea that the large overall NWRL corridor development is better placed (from 
Government’s perspective) when broken into manageable chunks (Transport for NSW 
2012a, p12-15). In practice this has meant separating “rolling stock and operations” from two 
traditionally-procured design-construction elements (at-grade and underground corridor 
respectively) and a preparatory civil works contract. Perhaps, harsh lessons from NWRL’s 
very different rolling stock PPP predecessor (Waratah) have focused NSW government 
minds on the necessity of risk-mitigation for large-scale transport works. This realistic 
approach to risk, and the sensible idea of breaking a large project into manageable 
components seem to run counter to many anecdotally-expressed hopes that PPPs would 
provide a mega-scale feeding frenzy for the corporate sector.  
 
“The PPP will ...ensure ...appropriate balance of risk transfer with the optimal combination of 
private sector financing and State contribution.” (Transport for NSW 2011a, p15) 
 
Fare revenue and ridership are again treated agnostically in the NWRL concept. The project 
is pitched as a PPP (which it is), but documentation is clear that funding ultimately comes 
entirely from state government consolidated revenue (see Transport for NSW 2011a, p15). 
 
Waratah 
Any lessons for future projects arising from Sydney’s Waratah rolling stock delivery and 
leasing project are not clear-cut - but they do seem to speak to possible pitfalls for PPPs 
where the private-side actor is not tied into any sense of the demands that large daily 
passenger volumes place on transit agencies. The “costs” of project delay are undoubtedly 
huge for an agency such as RailCorp, and its elected overseers (see Saulwick 2011; 
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RailCorp 2012, p7). The public narrative of Waratah has revolved around manufacturing 
integration problems leading to timing and cost over-runs. There appears to be another 
emergent narrative of the sponsoring government being, in reality, the last port-of-call and 
the ultimate guarantor of project risk where and as the private-side partner comes into 
project-related problems (see AAP 2012). It is not clear that this scenario is specific only to 
the “availability” PPP model, but it does again indicate that this particular variant carries 
significant sponsor-side risk potential. Waratah stands notable as one of the largest public 
transport PPPs in Australian or recent international experience (see Table 1.) – and also for 
its status as one of the larger PPPs of any type ever executed in Australia (Hodge & Duffield 
2010, p410). This “risk” dynamic belies the common anecdotal (rather than evidence-based) 
storyline that moving toward PPPs invariably involves a useful “shifting of risk to those 
parties in a best position to bear it...” Another, blunter interpretation might simply be that the 
public sector is the party most able to bear large-scale risk in large-scale public works 
projects (see Hodge & Duffield 2010, p405). 
 
Revenue-oriented transit PPP exemplars 
A revenue-oriented public transport PPP would appear to be one that does incorporate some 
level of ridership and farebox, or other revenue risk - and upside opportunity. 
 
The discussion on public transport planning, financing and operations tends to suggest quite 
clearly that transit agencies are best placed where they roll up their sleeves and proactively 
chase ridership growth, and improved farebox position over time (Vuchic 2005, ch7-9; 
Walker 2008; DfT 2011; Transport for NSW 2012b, ch10). One can only assume that this 
dictum would follow-through into a transit PPP design-build-operate scenario or similar. 
Undoubtedly any interpretation of the value of “chasing ridership” is complicated by the split 
between profitable East Asian rail companies, and subsidised European, US and Australian 
counterparts. Although this particular researcher’s view suggests that the more successful of 
European and US players (say; Munich MVV, Transport for London; BART; Washington 
DC’s WMATA) all tend to see reasonably robust farebox recovery, correspondingly low levels 
of subsidy (comparatively speaking) and some documented sense of being in a strategic, 
tactical and marketing-based “hunt for passengers” over time (Hale 2011a). The outstanding 
revenue position of the East Asian industry also seems in large part a function of their 
revenue-focused strategic paradigm (see HK MTR 2011). Train tickets do not sell 
themselves, to be sure... 
 
The passenger rail industry in Australia is a) quite robust in passenger volume terms (BITRE 
2012), but b) exceedingly heavily subsidised (Hale 2011a), and c) traditionally somewhat 
averse to proactive ridership growth goals or revenue-consolidation strategies. In this sense, 
Australia operators such as Metro Trains Melbourne (part-owned by Hong Kong MTR) or 
Queensland Rail (a service-contracted government-owned corporation) appear to be stuck in 
a cash-for-train-movements scenario, which is revenue and ridership-agnostic. As an 
example - during 2011-12 Queensland Rail slightly increased its revenues, primarily from 
government transfer, against a slight fall in ridership (Queensland Rail 2012).  
 
At face value (and being forgiving about the lack of readily-available project and partnership 
details) there seem to be useful transit PPP reference cases emerging via the Asian mass 
transit project examples (see Table 1.) - including the Beijing and Shenzhen metro lines (the 
latter of which the researcher has experienced first-hand) and presumably the emerging 
Manila LRT 1 corridor and transaction. Of the Shenzhen exemplar, an observer can at least 
say (in contrast to the Denver Eagle P3 project) that it is built and positioned to handle large 
numbers of passengers in a ‘traditional’ mass transit format that is closely integrated with 
land use and ridership generation clusters. The Manila example is also scant in terms of 
publically-available information. But details which do emerge speak of a high-volume 
corridor, at an affordable construction cost (around $US 62.5m per km), where ridership and 
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revenue are positioned for presumed operating profitability (the currently operational section 
is quoted at a farebox ratio of 1.45) (LRTA and Department of Transport & Communications 
2012). This is clearly a mass transit business exercise in the fullest sense – where design, 
engineering, operations and marketing will presumably be positioned around optimising 
revenue against cost through ridership growth and volume. Customer-service orientation is 
likely to be reasonably robust in this context. The Manila model is also notable in seemingly 
countenancing a 50/50 government/private project cost arrangement. Whether this is a 
potential equity arrangement is not clear – but the possibility does not seem precluded. More 
problematic is the documentation’s suggestion that “highest concession fee” is the key 
financial criteria for bid selection. It is not entirely clear that this is the logical first priority in a 
public interest setting, where infrastructure and operations plays a cornerstone role in urban 
structure and movement. The established literature would suggest a large variety of 
alternative and competing economic, financial and functional criteria for mass transit beyond 
direct payments to government (see Vuchic 2005; Mees 2010; Cervero 1998). At the very 
least one wonders what such payments to government (arising from a mass transit PPP) 
could possibly be employed for, if not for improving the experience of public transport users 
and the position of transit infrastructure in Manila... If these are to be priorities, then the 
importance of a payment to government becomes unclear or problematic in a PPP-bid 
scenario. 
 
Summary of two pathways 
One is drawn to the depth of information and pre-planning that appears to have been 
employed in the GCLR exemplar – which tends to set a standard via a medium-term program 
in which broader transport planning imperatives feed into a transit PPP design-construct-
operate contract. GCLR appears to have produced sensible system design outcomes and 
future city-building opportunities, via a solid concept development process accompanied by 
reasonably open documentation. Less clear is the longer-term relationship between Goldlinq 
as operator, and its passenger market. Eagle, by contrast, appears to have been excessively 
contract or transaction-focused at the expense of mainstream public transport goals (such as 
ridership and city-shaping).  
 
The revenue-oriented PPP option seems at first glance relevant mainly to Asian conditions of 
high passenger volume and a liquid operating finance position in mass transit. But on the 
other hand, it is not conceptually or logically clear that ridership targets and ridership 
risk/opportunity could not be built into a transit PPP arrangement in an Australian or US 
context... The UK’s privatisation history has proven confounding – with subsidies seemingly 
growing at a faster rate than ridership (Shaoul et al 2012). Perhaps the ultimate path forward 
for PPPs as a transit implementation option revolves around a maturing of the market’s 
willingness to engage with ridership risk. 
 
Risk more broadly is, as expected, clearly present as a core topic throughout the listed 
exemplars. Whether in a stations context (at Southern Cross) or in rolling stock availability 
(Waratah) – large project cost over-runs involve a burdening of either private or public 
stakeholders with the logical outcomes of demanding risk guarantor roles. In Southern Cross, 
the private sector largely bore the brunt, while in Waratah, public stakeholders became the 
ultimate port-of-call when cost escalation exceeded the private guarantor’s ability to cope 
(regardless of intentions in contract). An overall appraisal might tend to suggest that large-
scale risk-shifting to the private sector, on the balance of probability, is not as applicable a 
rationale for transit PPPs as first-generation PPP proponents might have suggested (for 
discussion see Wilson et al 2010; Raisbeck et al 2010, p346; Shaoul et al 2012). 
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4. BEYOND PPP - JOINT POWERS AUTHORITIES AND OTHER 
‘BLENDED FINANCING’ EXAMPLES 
 
International experience would tend to suggest another set of emergent “non-mainstream” 
project approaches that bring together various public sector stakeholders around commercial 
revenue streams in a transit infrastructure setting. For want of a better terminology, these will 
be referred to below interchangeably as “Joint Powers” and/or “blended financing” options 
and models. 
 
Great promise, few exemplars... 
The leading exemplar of the “joint powers” project type, and one of very few that reaches 
genuine scale, would appear to be San Francisco’s Transbay Terminal project (see TJPA 
2011a; SFRA 2011). In this instance, a list of reasonably diverse public sector agencies 
combine their interests in development of a specific facility via a special purpose 
arrangement that also addresses commercial revenue (primarily in the form of real estate 
development), and which incorporates mainstream project borrowing. In short, multiple 
government revenue and borrowing streams are incorporated (TJPA 2011b). 
 
The reason for including this particular model, given its lack of broad track record or any 
wide-ranging industry support seems to be the almost unassailable logic of combining 
various interests into an equity-based arrangement - which opens the possibility of 
commercial revenues and commercial returns in a public transit infrastructure context. 
 
The Los Angeles 30-10 plan (LACMTA 2010a; 2010b), while not immediately or obviously 
connected to the Transbay Terminal example, will also be listed in this paper because of its 
status as an innovative project suite (or project approach) in its own right. Its point of 
commonality with Transbay may well be the idea that a fit-for-purpose project arrangement 
should be created - rather than mobilising an off-the-shelf project typology in search of a 
project (as the PPP option often seems to be, in its public transport incarnations). For the 
purposes of this paper we will apply a “blended finance” label to LA 30-10 (and by 
implication, to other projects that may emerge under this approach or typology).  
 
LA 30-10 combines quite a wide array of funding streams and folds them into project-level 
financing and implementation packages. The strengths of this “blended finance” approach 
seem to revolve around flexibility, openness, and the willingness to source and utilise 
multiple funding streams with the aim of leveraging and accelerating implementation with the 
assistance of project-level borrowing. So many mass transit infrastructure projects, especially 
in Australia, tend toward the assumption of only one or two sources of go-or-no-go public 
sector funds - and when this fails a  “lack of money” is invariably blamed and bemoaned. The 
alternative then seems to be “a PPP” – although proponents seldom spell-out the user-pays 
or consolidated-revenue regime presumably required to back any availability payments. 
 
This researcher would judge the “blended” model likely to achieve certain levels of 
awareness and interest in years to come, with stakeholders perhaps watching LA 30-10 for 
signs of success, failure, re-applicability, or otherwise. Equally, the “joint powers” model 
offered by Transbay seems likely to emerge as a concept that increasingly competes with 
PPPs as an implementation packaging option. These are predicated around ideas of value 
capture – a topic receiving ever-increasing attention (see Transport for NSW 2012b, ch10; 
Miller & Hale 2011; US GAO 2010). These models also seem to connect meaningfully with 
the concept of “institutional PPPs” as a more business-like, equity-based, multi-partner 
arrangement (see Duffield 2010, p187). 
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5. CONCLUSIONS – FLEXIBILITY, OPENNESS AND 
PASSENGER EXPERIENCE AS CRITERIA FOR FUTURE FOCUS 
 
“Governance in its broadest sense is very strategic and involves rules about behaviours that 
we wish to have exhibited in our society. It is not just about profit maximisation. It is, for 
example, truthfulness, fairness, transparency, probity and integrity in how we achieve a 
stable, healthy society in the fullest sense ...” (Wilson et al 2010, p201)  
 
In this concluding section we briefly re-summarise and re-appraise the value and applicability 
of various PPP approaches and the other identified project resourcing options.  
 
With PPPs, an initial issue tends to emerge in scoping – around whether a reasonably clear 
corridor reference design is important, or not. A further set of issues seem then to revolve 
around whether an immediate-horizon contract or transaction is the focus, or whether longer-
term contingencies and partnerships are the goal. Both of these questions come together in 
the choice, if one exists, between pursuing a revenue-oriented or revenue-agnostic and 
availability-based PPP option. 
 
The obsessive transaction emphasis of many PPP exercises should be debated more 
vigorously. With transit being a people-focused, complex and challenging set of activities, it 
seems almost impossible that any given PPP contract could ever cover the full range of 
contingencies, changed circumstances, demand fluctuations, and new scenarios that emerge 
over, say, a 20 year contract period (Shaoul et al 2012). In this sense, this researcher is 
highly critical of the idea that a public transport PPP “works” as an outcome of initial contract 
negotiation, on the basis of rigid up-and-down-the-line movement of vehicles. The basic need 
for flexibility over time does not seem to be addressed in many pre-existing transit PPPs. 
 
Regarding the two different PPP orientations for public transport, one can only presume that 
a revenue-oriented model is “better” - in so far as it connects with the established body of 
literature, understanding and practice that focuses on ridership growth and revenue 
optimisation as necessary elements in mass transit success. This is inter-related to the need 
for customer-service orientation, and close integration with passenger catchments and 
markets - whether through urban design and station facilities, network integration, or other 
mechanisms.  
 
There are two counter-points to the “revenue-oriented” PPP approach – one obvious, one 
less-so. Firstly, many commentators would undoubtedly point to the subsidised nature of 
mass transit operations in the USA, Europe or Australia and suggest that a ticket revenue or 
ridership focused transit PPP is inherently non-applicable in their jurisdiction. But any such 
presumption would be incorrect – in that corporatized or privatised passenger operations 
such as Queensland Rail or Metro Trains Melbourne actually run on a commercial profit-
margin basis. Government simply guarantees their organisational operating margin via an 
effective subsidy whereby the cost of running trains over and above ticket sales is covered. 
So – in these instances, a private/corporate arrangement is profitable for the private or 
corporate franchisee, despite the subsidised nature of Australian mass transit. This particular 
researcher has often engaged in discussion with localised transit stakeholders around the 
problem of Metro Trains and/or Queensland Rail being almost entirely reduced to a train-
movement focus, with only the most opaque and vague connection between ridership growth 
and organisational incentive. Undoubtedly though, ridership-cultivation and customer service 
are difficult challenges. It is quite possible that the corporate sector prefers to move trains up-
and-down the line while receiving a guaranteed margin for that activity – rather than 
engaging with the messy question of actually competing against private vehicles for travellers 
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in order to define organisational success or failure. Perhaps this “lack of interest” in moving 
into a contested transport market is the second, and possibly the most influential reason why 
the corporate sector tends to push an availability model where transit PPPs or other 
privatised scenarios are envisaged. 
 
 
Table 2. Criteria for Adopting Emergent Transit Project 
Financing Approaches  
 
– as proffered in a variety of sources 
 
 
Unconvincing Criteria 
 
“PPPs because the market demands one” 
“PPPs because the private sector is inherently better” 
“Unless there is a PPP, it won’t get built” 
“If investors go broke – the public gets free infrastructure” 
Payments to government as primary bid criteria 
De-scoping of project presented as ‘efficiency’ dividend 
Hand-over detailed project planning to consortium - to relieve 
public sector burden of involvement in planning 
‘Risk transfer’ from public to private actors 
‘Off balance sheet’ capital investment option (for governments) 
 
Convincing & Valid Criteria 
 
Selection of the most cost-effective option (regardless of model) 
Selecting a financing option in line with orderly ongoing capital 
investment programs 
Selecting option that optimises project scope or system 
performance 
Maximising transit ridership or usage 
Optimising value and impact of available subsidy and resources 
Maximising ticket revenues 
Effective land use integration & urban design outcomes 
Better facilities for passengers 
Improved overall level-of-service 
Flexibility over time 
Creating private and public sector capital investment opportunities 
that support agreed strategic goals over time (e.g.- mode share, 
ridership, system expansion) 
Transparency & accountability 
The public interest 
 
 
Another major challenge lies in the fields of openness, transparency, governance and 
transport organisational cultures. Reading through the documentation from our exemplars, it 
became clear that certain project participants were at pains to communicate and address 
their “lessons learned” to industry (rather than to the public or taxpayers). Perhaps they are 
touting for future work – because the documents often read that way to this reviewer. On the 
whole, PPPs (and our listed transit project exemplars to some degree) seem to exist in a 
continuum of confidentiality and even secrecy that does not appear to be justified by the 
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pretext of “commerciality”. Taxpayer funds are taxpayer funds - and while initial negotiation 
and the proposals of non-successful bidders should remain “commercial in-confidence”, 
there appears to be no valid reason for avoiding full disclosure and clarity of the 
arrangements between taxpayers and their corporate PPP servants. In Australia, this reality 
is at least partially recognised in the public posting of major Metro Trains Melbourne 
contracts. In summary, a full maturing of the transit PPP as an implementation option can 
probably only arise alongside a maturing of corporate and government posture toward 
project openness and transparency. 
 
Final points surround the important role “joint powers” and “blended finance” models will 
likely play in transit infrastructure delivery in years to come. The PPP option has been framed 
as a choice between “traditional” design-construct procurement and a corporate-led 
revolution in infrastructure efficiency and productivity (via PPPs which paradoxically carry 
massive financing and transactional costs). An objective appraisal might conclude, by 
contrast, that there are actually three basic pathways now open to public transport 
stakeholders. They can: procure traditionally; pursue PPP options; or compare both of these 
to a commercially-driven joint powers arrangement that mixes multiple sources of public 
sector funding and equity, closely matched to community and stakeholder needs across a 
range of fronts. 
 
And herein lies the shock of the new for PPP-proponents. Just as the PPP model reaches a 
certain level of formative maturity in public transport contexts, another option – perhaps more 
flexible – emerges to compete for attention. 
 
In the discussion of public transport project options, we have definitely reached the end of 
the line for business as usual... 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Former Transbay Terminal in San Francisco – an unlikely launching pad for a 21st 
century mass transit financing revolution...? (author 2008) 
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